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Abstract 
Studies upon impact of macro variables on firm’s dividend policy are very limited and 
specifically rare in Pakistan perspective. Main purpose of this research paper is to observe 
impact of restricted monetary policy on dividend behavior of Pakistani firms. During restricted 
monetary policy, cost of external funds increases and firms prefer to utilize internal funds 
leading to reduction in dividend payout. Behaviour of 100 listed firms, selected purposefully, has 
been observed for the period from 2001 to 2009 by using Lintner’ modified model.. During the 
research period of nine years, monetary policy has been gone through both loose and tight 
phases. Proposed model is dynamic one as lagged dependent variable has been used as 
explanatory variable. Due to certain limitations with selection of monetary policy instrument, 
overall stance of State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) in its annual reports has been used as a dummy 
variable in the model. Results of all the three estimations reveal almost same results. First lagged 
dividend has been proved to be most deterministic factor of dividend policy followed by current 
earnings. Monetary policy and lagged dividends interactive variables provide mixed results. First 
interactive variable has negative coefficients in all three, fixed effect, random effects and GMM, 
models but with insignificant p values. Second monetary policy interactive variable has positive 
coefficients with significant values in random effects and GMM model. Firms seem to follow 
relatively stable dividend policies with lower adjustment factor. As model is dynamic, GMM 
estimation is preferred. Monetary policy has not been observed as significant determinant of 
dividend policy of Pakistani firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Dividend behavior has extensively been reviewed by many researchers from time to time 
across different countries. Empirical evidences observed in most of the studies reveal equivocal 
results about dividend theories (Bhattacharyya, 2007). Since, in absence of any unanimous 
findings, need for future research has not been restricted, theoretically. In developing countries 
like Pakistan, where limited research is available on corporate dividend policy, need for future 
research is more looked for. Most of the available research papers, address only firm specific 
determinants of dividend policy.  Do macroeconomic variables influence corporate financing 
decisions? The need to address this question is the prime motive of this research paper.  Major 
objective of this paper is to observe dividend behavior of listed firms in Pakistan under monetary 
policy restrictions and this is the first attempt of its kind in Pakistan to the best of my 
Knowledge.  This study is very relevant in present scenario since State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) 
has been persistently pursuing restricted monetary policy since 2005 to control inflation.
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Miller & Modigliani are the focal names when we start thinking about dividend theories. 
MM theory of irrelevance, as quoted by Van Horne (1998), based upon assumption of perfect 
capital market, states that dividend policy has no affect upon value of the firm. Nonetheless, 
when markets are not perfect, as it is, dividend policy does matter and affect value of the firm as 
both managers and investor favor dividend payments as validated by many researchers. 
  
                                                             
1 Annual Report of State Bank of Pakistan Various Issues 
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2.  Monetary Policy in Pakistan 
Pakistan is an emerging economy. After deregulation & privatization, in 1990s, studying 
macro variables is of paramount importance and interest. Pakistan started liberalization of the 
economy and also adopted market based monetary policy system. Main motive of monetary 
policy is to ensure low inflation along with sustainable economic growth. It regulates cost & 
allocates money & credit in the economy. Before liberalization, interest rates were used to be 
fixed by the regulatory bodies whereas after liberalization, State Bank of Pakistan‘s (SBP) open 
market operation is announced to be the major instrument of monetary policy in 1995.  
In year 2001, Although Pakistan put efforts to bring macroeconomic fundamentals back 
on track its monetary policy had to be tempered due to conflicting economic goals. In overall 
terms monetary policy remained tight in year 2001 (SBP, 2001). Macroeconomic discipline 
achieved in year 2001 led to easing of monetary policy in year 2002. Trade deficit was much 
lower than year 2001 and inflation was down to 3.5% (SBP, 2002). Year 2003 again witnessed 
strong boost   rising real GDP growth to 5.1% level.  The scale and depth of improvement in year 
2003 is much higher than year 2002. SBP increased market liquidity by lowering discount rate 
substantially (SBP, 2003).  
Year 2004 again witnessed loose monetary stance being adopted by SBP since couple of 
years.  It not only led to an immense increase in aggregate demand along with increase in real 
GDP growth to over 6% but also contributed to growing inflationary pressures in the country 
(SBP, 2004). In year 2005 there is an important transition in monetary policy i.e. from 
accommodative to aggressive tightening, although SBP had started raising benchmark interest 
rates early in year 2004. Inflation was the main driving force behind this move (SBP, 2005). This 
4 
 
move continued in year 2006 although the chief policy variable, i.e discount rate remained same. 
However, State bank focused on draining excess liquidity from the market (SBP, 2006). 
In order to temperate demand pressures in the country, SBP sustained tight monetary 
policy in year 2007 (SBP, 2007).  Increased inflationary pressures led SBP to continue this 
policy in year 2008 & 2009 also (SBP, 2008) and (SBP, 2009).   
3.  Literature Review 
Starting from John Lintner (1956), noticeable work upon dividend behavior & policy has 
been carried out in different parts of the world. Lintner, in his research to know how firms decide 
to distribute their earnings revealed that current earnings and lagged dividends the foremost 
factors to be considered in dividend decisions. He surveyed 600 firms and on basis of interviews 
of officials developed a model and tested further. Results also reveal that firms tend towards their 
target payout ratios by partial adjustments reflecting soothing behavior. 
Following Lintner, many researchers explored other dividend determinants by 
extending/modifying Lintner’s model. Dividend policies of individual firms were studied by 
Fama, E. & Babiak, H. (1968) by modifying Lintner’s model. They deleted constant & added 
lagged profits in the model. Al-Najjar, B., (2009) studied dividend behavior of Jordanian firms 
and found that factors affecting dividend policy in developed countries are same as in case of 
Jordan. Results of his study also validated Lintner’s Model. Author used Pooled & Panel logit 
and tobit models on 86 non- financial listed companies. Ahmed & Javaid (2009) observed 
determinants of dividend policy in Pakistan along with testing of Lintner’s model of dividend 
soothing using panel data of 320 non-financial firms. Results reveal that firms rely, mainly, on 
5 
 
current earnings and past dividends for dividend decisions along with instability towards 
dividend soothing. 
Do foreign affiliates of a multinational firm depict same dividend behavior like of a 
parent company to its common shareholders? Interesting work completed by Desai, et. al. 
(2001), reveals that majority-owned foreign affiliates of American companies portray same 
dividend policy as of domestic companies paying dividends to diffused common shareholders. 
Musa & Fodio (2009) by using a model developed by Musa, studied dividend behavior of 
Nigerian firms revealing that previous dividend, current earnings, cash flow, investment and net 
current assets have significant impact on dividend policy. Dividend stability has been observed 
by Al-Yahyaee et. al. (2010) in Oman by working on a selected sample firms using Lintner’s 
model.  
Eriotis (2005) examined, in Greece, the effects of distributed earnings, size of the firm 
and changes in dividend and distributed earnings from the last year. Data comprises of a sample 
of 149 firms for a period of 5 years. Firms prefer to distribute each year a rather constant 
dividend, by adjusting to distributed earnings and size. 
Abor and Bopkin (2010) observed effects of investment opportunities and some other 
financial variables including some macro variables (inflation rate and GDP) as control variables. 
Study is based upon a sample of 34 emerging market countries, including Pakistan, for a period 
of 17 years from 1990-2006. Authors observed significant relationship between potential 
investment opportunity and dividend policy. Rozeff (1982) studied impact of agency costs, Beta 
(a proxy for financial and operating leverage) and growth of a firm, upon dividend policy. He 
observed significant results for all these variables. 
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Dividend behaviour similarity between US firms and developing countries (eight 
emerging Markets including Pakistan), observed by Aivazian, et. al (2003). However, sensitivity 
of variables differs as country specific situations may effect.  Interesting result is that in 
emerging markets, firms found to give higher dividend payments than US firms, although these 
face more financial constraints, relatively. Garrett and Priestly (2000) worked on aggregate stock 
market data of US firms with extended Lintner model and claimed that target dividends are a 
function of permanent earnings and lagged prices. They introduced new model which assumes 
that managers tend to minimize costs while pursuing for target dividends. Regarding Signaling 
theory, authors concluded that dividends signal about positive shocks to current permanent 
earnings and not to future permanent earnings. 
Bhattacharyya, N. et.al (2008) worked in a different dimension on a hypothesis that high 
quality agents (managers) have access to more positive NPV projects rather than low quality 
agents. High quality agent demands higher compensation. Model based upon this hypothesis, had 
been tested for Canadian firms over the period from 1993-95 using tobit regression analysis. 
Canadian firms found to support this hypothesis. 
Some authors have worked, specifically, on dividend determinants related to ownership 
of firms.  In Pakistan, ownership structure has significant impact upon dividend payout policy 
where as cash flows have insignificant impact. It is finding of a study by Afza and Mirza (2010), 
upon 100 companies listed at KSE. Board of directors act as a tool to monitor management and 
hence helps to resolve agency problems. However, composition of board does matter and have 
influence on dividend policy accordingly. In same way ownership structure also dominates 
corporate decisions involving voting requirements. Higher the concentration of ownership, 
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higher will be chances of exploitation of minority shareholder’s rights.  AbdelSalam, et al. 
(2008) examined above both elements in Egypt for a pooled data of 50 firms for three years 
using logit and tobit models. He found significant association between institutional ownership & 
dividend policy and insignificant for board composition. 
In family controlled firms, independent directors have significant impact on dividend 
policy. Atmaja (2010) observed this finding in his study upon Australian firms over the period 
from 2002-2005 using panel (random effects) regression. Pandy (2001) observed sensitivity of 
dividend behavior of Malaysian firms, using multi-logit analysis, to changes in earnings. In 
addition to observe sensitivity, application of Lintner’s framework depicted less stable dividend 
policies. Four possible behaviors i.e.: a. omission; b. decrease; c. increase; and d. no change, 
observed to three possible changes in earnings i.e. (increase, decrease & negative earnings). 
Not only internal but external factors, like monetary policy, do affect financial decisions 
of the firms. Pandey and Bhat (2007) observed, in India, that monetary policies have significant 
influence upon dividend behavior and 5% to 6% reduction observed in payout. Authors tested 
extended Lintner’s model using GMM estimator for data of 571 firms over a period of 8 years. 
Ameer (2008) worked out upon determinants of dividend policy of Malaysian Banks. He used 
ordered probit modeling technique, in addition to check speed of adjustment through Lintner 
model, to check flexibility of dividend policy to certain variables. In addition to firm specific, 
author observed monetary policy effects on dividend payout.  
Goddard, et. al. (2006) tested smoothing and signaling hypothesis upon 137 UK firms, 
over the period from 1970 to 2003. He observed contemporary relationship between dividends, 
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prices & earnings. Some evidence in favor of both hypotheses has been revealed by causality 
tests. 
Hussainey and Eisa (2009) in addition to work on dividend signaling hypothesis also 
included signaling behavior of voluntary disclosure statements incorporated in annual reports. By 
using event study methodology, they observed behavior of 33 UK non-financial firms after a 
decline in their sustained earnings growth. Findings do not support dividend signaling hypothesis 
however support disclosure signaling behavior. Nissim and Ziv (2001) examined signaling 
hypothesis and revealed, empirically, that dividend changes signal profitability level in 
subsequent years. 
Bhattacharyya (2007) argues continuity of search for more elucidations as he observed 
equivocal empirical results of dividend theories. He collected empirical work done based upon 
clientele, signaling and agency hypothesis and extracted stylized facts also.  
Dividend policies are affected by legal corporate framework of a particular country. 
Countries having better legal protection for minority shareholders, observe higher payouts. Porta. 
et. al. quoted their findings by doing empirical work over a cross section of 4000 firms of 33 
countries.  
Baker and Wurgler (2004) introduced catering theory of dividend. Authors proposed that 
when investors pay premium on stock price, they, infact, anticipate dividends and managers cater 
to them by paying dividends and vice versa. Empirical findings confirm to their theory.  
In addition to explicit claims, there are implicit claims, upon an organization, by non-
investor stakeholders (e.g. employees, customers, vendors etc.). These stakeholders may suffer 
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costs if a firm runs out of business i.e. cost of jobs search by employees, increased maintenance 
costs for customers etc. Firms offering more implicit guarantees are more valued. These have to 
maintain higher liquidity levels to pay off potential implicit claims. Hence being more 
conservative, trying to avoid from financial distress, use more equity. Dividend payout is less in 
these firms. Although this stakeholder’s theory is not very persuasive as firms maintaining this 
level of excellence earn higher profits and hence higher payouts. Holder et. al. (1998) tested this 
theory and validated existence of this relationship. 
Michel (1979) observed industry impact upon dividend policy in United States. There are 
similarities in structural characteristics of firms of an industry. Hence, different industries would 
have varying influences upon dividend policies as would have different investment opportunities. 
Empirical results, concluded by Michel (1979), confirm the assumption. 
4. Model & Methodology 
The Lintner dividend model can be assumed as the mother of all dividend behavior 
models. Almost all researches on dividend behavior are based upon this model, modified model 
or its enhanced versions and the same practice would be followed by us. However, our study 
focuses on dividend payment behaviour of Pakistani firms in tight monetary policy regime. In 
perfect capital market, as Miller and Modigliani proposed, cost of internally generated and 
external funds would not be different. But we are living in imperfect world and hence above 
proposition would not stand valid. There would be an information asymmetry between borrowers 
and lenders. A moral hazard of default would prevail. Investors have to incur project monitoring 
costs and also demand risk premium, hence cost of external funds will be greater than internal 
funds. At times of restricted monetary policy, cost of external funds increases and firms prefer to 
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utilize internal funds provided that firms have investment opportunities.  To maintain internal 
reserves, for internal financing, dividend payout decreases.  Although firms may go for external 
financing (debt), in case of monetary policy restriction, if it has yet to attain optimum level of 
capital structure and want to gain tax benefits of interest expense.  
 
Below mentioned is our proposed replicated model of Pandey and Bhat (2007).  
                                                                 
   = Dividend for firm i in time t 
   = Earnings (net profit) of firm i in time t 
     = Dividend in lagged year 1 
     = Dividend in lagged year 2 
   = Monetary restriction in year t– A dummy variable  
   accounts for individual firm effect while    measures time-based effect. Earning is a 
major & dominant dividend determinant for every firm. Lagged dividends, do have impact upon 
 
 
Cost of funds rises. (Restricted monetary policy) 
Dividend Payout Decreases 
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dividend payout as firms tend to move gradually to target dividends i.e. dividend soothing. 
Pandey and Bhat (2007) used two lagged periods rather one.  Monetary restriction is a dummy 
variable with value 1 in case of tight monetary policy and zero (0) otherwise. Identifying 
monetary policy with a only one variable, like discount rate, lending rates or money supply may 
not be very explanatory. Furthermore, in Pakistan monetary policy announcements are twice & 
thrice times a year from 2006 onwards and concluding a policy for whole year may be difficult.  
Hence, rather using, discount rate, lending rates or money supply etc. we use State Bank of 
Pakistan’s Annual reports for identification of restricted monetary policies in respective years. In 
annual reports, a single line sentence, describing overall monetary policy stance in that particular 
year, is available. From year 2001 to 2009, monetary policy is loose only in three years from 
2002 to 2004. 
Balanced panel data of 900 observations (100 cross section firms for 9 years) is being 
used in estimation of above model. Unlike cross section or time series, panel data encompass 
certain advantages. Gujrati (2003) has cited these advantages quoted by Baltagi (1995). Panel 
data takes heterogeneity into account through individual firm effect.  A combination of cross 
section & time series observations give more rich information, more variability, less collinearity 
among variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency. Panel data better detects and 
measures effects that are not observable in pure cross section or time series. The dynamics of 
change are better observed through panel data as repeated cross sections of observation are 
studied. In our estimation model, panel data would also serve best to study effect of monetary 
policy restrictions over the years and the dynamics of change in dividend payments. 
  
12 
 
4.1 Hypothesis 
                                  
                                  
Above proposed is a dynamic model with lagged dependent variable as explanatory 
variable. Dynamic models are bit difficult to estimate.  Dynamic models estimation is 
recommended through usage of GMM estimator as literature enforces it. 
5. Sample & Data 
A sample of 100 firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange has been selected.  To ensure 
equal participation of each industry, in sample, equal sample size (proportionately to respective 
population size) from each group has been selected. Source of panel data for the period of 2001-
2009, is State Bank of Pakistan. 
For industry classification, State bank’s classification, based upon economic grouping, 
has been used. State Bank of Pakistan has classified firms in nine economic groups based upon 
logical similarity in nature of business. Only non-financial firms are being analyzed like did by 
(Porta, et. al., 2000; Rozeff, 1982; Ahmed & Javaid, 2009; Al-Najjar, 2009; Musa & Fodio, 
2009; Hussainey, K. & Eisa, J., 2009). Financial structure of financial firms is considerably 
different from non-financial firms. Regulatory restrictions on financial firms influence their 
financing decisions and these restrictions affect financial firms’ more than non-financial firms. 
Like in case of banks, these are bound to maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio at all times, 
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under prudential regulations, and it influence their financing decision.  Ogler and Taggart (1983, 
cited in Ameer, 2008, p.1) empirically observed this later mentioned finding. 
Exclusion of Firms owned by State (wholly or partially, as best we can identify) as their 
financing decisions may have been affected due to government influence. This practice also 
adopted by other researchers like Porta, et. Al., 2000; Afza & Mirza, 2010. 
In order to be more pragmatic, factors, which may create biasness in research findings 
and hamper explanatory power of our explanatory variables, have been considered while sample 
selection.  Very small firms having net sales less than PKR 100 million, firms having negative 
net worth in more than one year, with unavailable data for one or more consecutive years, in 
losses for more than one consecutive year and those without dividend information are excluded. 
Pandey and Bhat (2007) also applied few of these criteria while sample selection. Consideration 
of losses and negative net worth is due to the fact that dividends are basically a primary function 
of an organization’s profitability & net worth. Firms, with better dividend payment record, have 
been preferred in sample. Musa and Fodio (2009) also quoted Kumar and Lee (2001) in favour 
of above point that reason for dropping zero dividend payout firms is that relative performance 
evaluation of dividend model is meaningless for such firms. Exclusion of negative worth firms 
also supports this logic as firms facing losses will definitely not be able to pay dividend and to 
check these firms in model will be meaningless. Afza and Mirza (2010) also have qualification 
that firms should not have missed dividend payment in more than one year and firms should not 
be in losses. Care has been taken to take into account those firms which are also part of KSE 30 
or 100 index so that sample should represent maximum of the market capitalization. 
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Table 1 
 
6. Results 
Table II, below, provides summary of descriptive statistics of earnings & dividends. 
There is an increasing trend in profits and dividends over the period of time as evident from their 
mean values. There is more variability in earnings as compared to dividends. Mean payout ratio 
prevails around 50% with less variability (standard deviation about 13%). 
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Table 2 
 
Table III depicts estimation results. Model 1 is fixed effects model (cross section fixed). 
Significant results for earnings and lagged dividend (1) have been observed at p-value of less 
than 1%. A coefficient of One lagged year dividend has greater influence upon dividend payment 
rather current earnings where as interactive variable of monetary restriction and lagged dividends 
have mixed and insignificant results. Coefficient of determination has significant value of 0.71. 
In model 2, random effects approach has been used. Here lagged dividend has significant results 
with coefficient of 0.72 at p-value of less than 1%. Current earnings have, comparatively, less 
coefficient value of 0.06 but also insignificant at 10%. Monetary restriction interactive variable 
1, like in Fixed effect model has also negative coefficient but insignificant as p-value is higher, 
even than 10%. Surprisingly, second monetary restriction interactive variable has positive 
coefficient along with significant results at 5%.  
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Table III 
 
Model 3 comprises of GMM estimation, which is urged, in dynamic panels. Our model is 
also a dynamic one. Lagged dependent variable may create biasness and GMM can manage it 
well. GMM estimation requires instruments and we have used explanatory variables as 
instruments. Results reveal almost similar trends like in models 1 & 2. Both earnings & one year 
lagged dividend have significant coefficient values at p-value of 1%. Lagged dividend 
coefficient has higher value than of earnings. Monetary restriction interactive variable, again in 
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this model, has negative coefficient supporting the hypothesis but is insignificant even at p-value 
of higher than 10%. Second lagged dividend is appeared with negative coefficient although 
insignificant. MR1 has negative coefficient but insignificant and surprisingly MR2 has positive 
coefficient and significant at p-value of 1%. Results of all four models portray a very similar and 
significant finding that first lagged dividend has a significant and highest positive impact upon 
dividend decision of firms in Pakistan. Current year earnings do have a positive & significant 
impact but follow the last year dividend in dividend decision. Due to mixed results and 
insignificant value for second lagged dividend variable, we can claim that monetary restriction 
does not have any significant bearing on dividend decisions of Pakistani firms although theory is 
opposite to the results. Coefficients of lagged dividend in all models range from 0.3 to 0.7. In 
model 4 value is 0.626 with adjustment parameter (1-0.62) = 0.38. Target payout ratio 
(0.20/0.38) is 53%. Firms seem to observe stable dividend policies. 
7. Conclusion 
Observing effect of monetary policy on dividend behavior is of paramount importance 
and to best of our knowledge, it is first study of its kind. Lintner’s model has been used to test 
dividend stability. For dynamic model estimation, GMM is strongly recommended method of 
estimation and same has been used in addition to fixed effects & random effect models. Pakistani 
firms have been observed to follow relatively stable dividend policies. Firms have moderate 
target payout ratios & adjustment factors. One year lagged dividends have strongest influence 
upon dividend decisions followed by current earnings. Insignificant results of monetary 
restriction variable do not claim any effect on dividend decisions of Pakistani firms. Although 
second monetary interactive variable has positive coefficient in GMM estimation but results of 
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first MR interactive variable and second lagged dividend variable lead to the above conclusion. 
Future research may include other macro-economic variables or more detailed work, by 
categorizing firms according to their growth/investment opportunities, may be carried out along 
with monetary policy variables. In addition, detailed investigation of why monetary policy 
restriction has not any significant impact upon dividend policy, needs to be sorted out. 
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